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Abstract. Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms, this paper seeks to understand the role of state 
ownership on firm performance (accounting-based returns) and firm value (market-based indicators). 
Results show that state ownership is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, state 
ownership has a moderating effect on the association between firm performance and firm value. At 
low levels of state ownership, firm performance is negatively associated with firm value. However, at 
high levels of state ownership, the association becomes positive. Drawing on signaling theory, the study 
helps to understand the role of state ownership in the association between firm performance and firm 
value, an area that has received minimum attention in research. Specifically, state ownership may be 
a strategic asset for Chinese listed firms boosting accounting returns but perceived differently by the 
market. Given the current levels of state ownership in many transitional economies, this study sheds 
light for policy makers on the effects of high or low levels of state ownership on firm performance and 
value. Moreover, the study may assist would-be investors who may contemplate investing in privatized 
SOEs, in China or other countries with similar institutional arrangements. 
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introduction
Transitional nations around the world have transformed their economies towards 
market-based systems (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Estrin, 
Hanousek, Kočenda, & Svejnar, 2007), including the privatization of public sector 
firms (Brada, 1996; Megginson & Netter, 2001). As a consequence, a variety of 
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ownership structures have emerged in privatized firms (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
To understand the impact of privatization, scholars have often used agency theory 
to study the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance as well 
as firm value1 (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Dharwadkar, George & Brandes, 2000). 
However, findings from this strand of studies have been somewhat mixed and at times, 
inconclusive (Hanousek, Kočenda & Svejnar, 2004; Megginson & Netter, 2001). Some 
scholars suggest that other issues such as competition (e.g. Shirley & Walsh, 2000) or 
the legal environment (e.g. Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999) should be 
part of the equation in studying the association between ownership and performance/
value in particular, and privatization in general. 
Consequently, we assume that the inconclusive findings of previous research are 
attributable to the different institutional contexts of the studies. For example, China’s 
development path is different from that of Eastern European nations in that she has 
transformed her economy without reforming the political system (e.g. Zhang, 2006; 
Estrin et al., 2007), a situation that possibly explains why the Chinese government still 
retains dominant ownership in the majority of privatized firms (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 
2008; Green & Liu, 2005). 
This paper examines the relationship between state ownership and firm performance 
in Chinese listed firms. The paper distinguishes itself from previous studies in 
two important aspects. First, it is not mainly grounded in agency theory, such an 
‘undersocialised’ approach (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), which commonly assumes 
a positive association between state ownership and agency cost, and thus a negative 
association between state ownership and firm performance/value. By contrast, we 
hypothesize that state ownership has a positive impact on firm performance (accounting 
returns) given a relatively unique institutional context of Chinese privatization in which 
the state may subjectively affect firm performance (Lin, 2004). Second, we initially 
explain the association between firm performance (accounting returns) and firm value 
(market-based returns) by proposing a moderating effect of state ownership on the 
relationship. We, therefore, argue that although state ownership has a positive impact 
on firm performance (which we consider as internal impact), state ownership and its 
property (i.e. impact of state ownership on firm performance) have a negative signaling 
effect to the establishment of the firm’s market value (external impact). In other words, 
firm value is established divergently from reported firm performance by the impact of 
state ownership. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
institutional context of Chinese state ownership and firm performance. It is followed by 
the development of hypotheses. The last three sections consider research methodology, 
results and conclusions of this study. 
1 Firm performance refers to firm accounting-based performance or accounting returns, and firm value to 
market-based performance.
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Institutional Background
Privatization has been extensively employed in transitional economies, and both 
theoretical and descriptive studies have generally proved that private firms and 
privatized firms are more efficient than state owned enterprises (hereafter, SOEs) 
(Shirley & Walsh, 2000; Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Privatization leads to cost efficiency 
and innovation (Shleifer, 1998), and improved corporate governance and competition 
(Shirley & Walsh, 2000). However, privatization has its own opponents because it has 
not always produced satisfactory outcomes for all stakeholders in all contexts (Birdsall 
& Nellis, 2005). Most noticeably, the resulting loss of employment from privatization 
is critical to the survival of politicians, and consequently, of the government (Boycko, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). 
China started reforming her economy in general and her SOEs in particular, in the 
late 1970s. Reform of these firms had become imperative since the central planning 
economy had, previously, been burdened with a huge number of loss-making SOEs 
which are technologically inefficient (Harvie & Naughton, 2000), characterized by 
cradle-to-grave social welfares (Broadman, 1999). Due to the reforms, the total factor 
productivity of SOEs has increased (Li, 1997), the managerial incentives have been 
improved (Groves, Hong, McMillan, & Naughton, 1997), and the economic decision 
making has relatively been decentralized (Cao, Qian, & Weingast, 1999; Lau, Qian, & 
Roland, 2000). 
The establishment of two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990, 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991 was a milestone in the Chinese economic 
reform process. Although listing on the two stock exchanges is strictly controlled by the 
government and subjective through a quota system and the selection of the enterprises 
respectively (Aharony, Lee & Wong, 2000), the two financial institutions have fostered 
a significant increase in the number of listed companies: from 10 in the beginning to 
1,430 by the end of February 2007 ( Jingu, 2007). Moreover, recent accelerated reforms 
have led to changes in the ownership structure, favoring a less concentrated ownership 
of listed firms. Indeed, the proportion of firms that have the largest shareholder owning 
less than 35% has increased from 42% to 52%, and the percentage of firms that have the 
largest shareholder owning more than 50% has declined from 33% (in 2005) to 19% (in 
2007) ( Jingu, 2007).
However, the Chinese government is still considered as being reluctant to commit 
itself to privatization (Hassard, Morris, & Sheehan, 2002; Wei, Xie & Zhang, 2005). 
Privatization of large SOEs is referred to as corporatization-or gufenhua (a formation 
of shareholding or joint stock firms) in Chinese lexicon (McNally & Lee, 1998), 
implying that the government remains a shareholder in privatized firms. Green & 
Liu (2005) characterize the Chinese privatization as the “retreat and retain” strategy, 
where the government privatizes small and medium SOEs while maintaining high 
levels of ownership in large and strategic ones. With such an approach, however, the 
Chinese government is evaluated as being successful both in solving the problem of 
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SOE efficiency, at the same time minimizing the unfavorable impact of privatization 
on employment (Hassard et al., 2002; Wei et al., 2003). Indeed, state ownership still 
prevails in many firms and industries of post-reform China (Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 
2003; Green & Liu, 2005). Therefore, the relative endurance of Chinese state 
ownership implies that it should be examined as an institutional strategic issue rather 
than as a financial constituent of firm ownership structure in its association with firm 
performance. 
Theory and hypotheses
Chinese State Qwnership and Firm Performance
In this state-dominated economic environment, most studies on Chinese ownership 
and firm performance and firm value have utilized agency theory and have generally 
produced inconclusive results. We assume that applying agency theory in the analysis 
of state ownership in an economy that is not sufficiently market-oriented, as is the case 
in developed economies such as the USA or UK, without considering the dynamic 
institutional context, is the main reason for the inconclusiveness. Indeed, scholars have 
increasingly spoken of the ‘undersocialized’ nature of agency theory (e.g., Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003), and its failure to embrace the institutional context (Chizema, 2010). 
Chinese listed firms are often studied in this context (i.e., grounded in agency 
theory) as if they are more market-oriented and freer from state interference than typical 
SOEs (Green & Liu, 2005). For example, Sun and Tong (2003) study 634 listed firms 
on the two Chinese stock exchanges from 1994-1998 and find that state ownership 
has no statistical significant relationship with firm performance. With Chinese firms 
cross- listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, Jia, Sun and Tong (2005) show that 
state ownership is negatively associated with firm performance. In addition, Xu and 
Wang (1999) and Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000) find that the return on equity of Chinese 
listed firms is positively related to institutional ownership but negatively related to 
state ownership. Xu and Wang (1999) also find that there is a positive and significant 
correlation between ownership concentration and profitability.  
In general, these studies on ownership draw their reasoning, for a negative association 
between state ownership and firm performance, from Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency perspective by assuming that state ownership is separated from the management 
of government-appointed managers. Consequently, the managers have incentive to 
shirk, or to exert less than full effort in creating value for shareholders. However, we 
assume that agency theory, developed in the context of developed North American 
capital markets, may not be sufficient or suitable to explain the relationship between 
state ownership and firm performance/value in the Chinese context. Studies on this 
issue often start with basing on agency theory then have to borrow other perspectives 
to explain the “unexpected” results in the findings (e.g., Wei et al, 2005). Therefore, 
in addition to the negative association between state ownership and firm performance 
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documented by previous studies, there has been evidence of the positive impact of 
state ownership on firm performance. Specifically, Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) find 
that state ownership is positively associated with firm performance and the relationship 
has an inverted U-shape. Also with Chinese listed firms, Tian and Estrin (2005) find 
that state ownership has a positive association with return on assets and Chen, Firth 
and Rui, (2006) find it to be positively related to return on sales. This paper explains 
the relationship between state ownership and firm performance in Chinese privatized 
firms based on the Chinese unique institutional context in which state ownership is 
considered a strategic factor in its relationship with firm performance. 
We argue that, as a dominant shareholder in Chinese privatized firms, the state is 
very likely to provide firms with financial and political resources through a “helping 
hand” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998), thus possibly improving reported firm performance. 
In addition, the Chinese government may apply administrative instruments such 
as preferential market entry regulations, favorable taxation and loans decisions to 
support firms with high levels of state ownership.  Indeed, it has been documented that 
the Chinese government still provides important networks for obtaining bank loans 
(Gordon & Li, 2003), and privatized firms with high levels of state ownership may have 
easier access to favorable lending from the Chinese state banks (Lu, Thangavelu, & 
Hu, 2005; Cull & Xu, 2003). This support, certainly, facilitates revenue increase, costs 
reduction and performance improvement of the firms (Lu, 2000).
 Thus, the advantage of the ‘state factor’, manifested in state ownership, has also 
been examined in strategic management literature and empirically realized at firm level. 
For example, the state can provide firms with competitive advantages improving firm 
performance in partner selection for joint ventures in China (Luo, 1997; Hitt et al., 
2000; Hoskisson et al., 2000). In business group studies, state is also proved to be a 
strategic asset employed by firms to advance their competitive advantage for better firm 
performance (Guthrie, 1997; Nolan, 2001; Peng, 2002). 
Through the positive impact of the governmental support, firm performance may 
be attributable to the state’s administrative “push”. Particularly, profitable privatized 
firms may be used as a demonstration of the efficiency of economic reforms in order 
to help the state sell firms’ shares at higher prices (Green & Liu, 2005), and higher 
state ownership has been found to relate to the manipulation of reported accounting 
information (Lin, 2004).
Moreover, recent studies have provided interesting results on the positive impact 
of stock exchange listing on firm performance, and SOEs tend to perform better when 
they are listed (Chen, Li & Lin, 2007). Studies also show that the threat of further 
privatization (reducing state ownership) has been an impetus behind government 
performance (Price, 2007). In addition, Le and O’Brien (2011) find that state 
ownership has a positive impact on firm performance in a context of high debt and 
equity ratio. Therefore, we suggest that these positive factors may have encouraged 
managers of Chinese privatized SOEs with high level of state ownership to improve 
firm performance. We propose our first hypothesis as follows:
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Hypothesis 1:  State ownership has a positive association with firm performance in transition 
economies. 
However, a high level of state ownership may not necessarily be highly valued by 
the market even in a situation where a high level of firm performance (as measured 
by accounting returns) is reported. One way to look at this argument is through a 
consideration of the signaling effect of state ownership, the possible resulting perception 
by market actors. Such is the discussion of the next sub-section.
The Signaling Effect of State Ownership on the Performance-value Relationship
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between state ownership and firm performance/
value has been extensively studied in business and management literature. However, 
the relationship between firm performance (accounting-based performance) and firm 
value (market-based performance) seems to be overlooked. The paper raises a question 
on the inconclusiveness of previous studies on the association between state ownership 
and firm performance versus firm value in the Chinese context. We assume that, together 
with firm performance (reported accounting returns), state ownership has a signaling 
effect on the establishment of firm value. More specifically, state ownership and its own 
impact on firm performance gives signals to investors to determine firm value. Before 
examining the possible signaling effect of state ownership on the association between 
firm performance and firm value, we examine the association itself. 
Jia et al. (2005) find that state ownership has a negative relationship with both 
firm performance (ROA, ROS, ROE) and firm value (Market/Book value) while 
Tian and Estrin (2005) show that state ownership is positively related to both firm 
performance (ROA) and firm value (Tobin’s Q). However, more importantly, there 
are many studies demonstrating the difference between the impact of state ownership 
on firm performance with that on firm value in Chinese listed firms. For example, Sun 
and Tong (2003) find that state ownership has a  non-significant relationship with firm 
performance  (ROS, EBIT/Sales)  but a negative association with firm value (Market/
Book value). Xu and Wang (1999) find that state ownership has a negative relationship 
with firm performance (ROE, ROA) but a non-significant association with firm value 
(Market/Book value). With regard to the studies focusing on the relationship between 
state ownership and firm performance, the findings are mixed. Some show that state 
ownership is negatively related to firm performance (e.g., Qi et al., 2000). Others show 
a positive association between state ownership and firm performance (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2006) and a third stream of research reports a non-significant association between 
the two variables (Wang, 2005; Sun & Tong, 2003). These studies might not pay 
sufficient attention to how the investors in the market perceive firms taking levels of 
state ownership into their consideration. 
In contrast to the above studies on the relationship between state ownership and 
firm performance/value, Wei et al. (2005) and Wei and Valera (2003) find a negative 
association between state ownership and firm value (Tobin Q). 
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In general, except for Tian and Estrin (2005) who find a positive association 
between state ownership and firm value, most studies show that state ownership has 
a negative association with firm value. More importantly, as noted, studies provide 
evidence for the disparity between the state ownership/firm performance association 
and state ownership/firm value association even though the studies might have ignored 
the difference between the reported accounting returns such as ROA, ROS and firm 
value measured by Tobin’s Q. 
We assume that the accounting versus market measurements should be treated 
differently if they are studied in the same context. Indeed, the difference as well as the 
relationship between the accounting returns of ROA and ROS and Tobin’s Q has long 
been discussed (Smirlock, Gilligan & Marshall, 1984; Steven, 1990) in economics and 
accounting. Accounting literature suggests that firm book value is the outcome of the 
application of accounting principles. For example, conservative accounting produces 
low firm performance (accounting returns). As a consequence, firm market value 
is larger than the firm book value. We assume that the institutional context of China 
dominated by state control implies a biased accounting system in favor of reporting 
high accounting returns (Lin, 2004). Therefore, being consistent with our argument 
in H1, and with common empirical findings from previous studies, which reflect the 
variation between the impact of state ownership on firm performance and that on firm 
value (i.e., in a descriptive standpoint), we propose a negative association between firm 
performance and firm value. 
However, the main objective of this paper is not to descriptively confirm the relationship 
between firm performance and firm value, rather, it is to explain it. More specifically, we 
propose and test the interaction effect of state ownership on the relationship between firm 
performance and firm value, using signaling theory as our lens.  
Signaling theory has long been used in finance and economics to explain the 
positive association between dividend announcements and firm value (e.g. Allen and 
Michaely, 2003) Brickley, 1983; DaDalt et al., 2002; Grinblatt, Masulis & Titman, 
1984). Interestingly, Su (2005) shows that while shareholders in developed countries 
respond positively to stock dividend announcement, Chinese shareholders react 
negatively to stock dividend distribution. Indeed, Su (2005) also finds that Chinese 
firms with high levels of state ownership tend to distribute stock dividends. However, 
this strategic selection signals a poor performance of firms in the long run (Su, 2005). 
Therefore, Su (2005) strongly implies that Chinese privatized SOEs with high levels of 
state ownership, which attain highly reported firm performance, are likely (to distribute 
stock dividends and consequently) to experience a reduction in firm value.  
Signaling theory has also been applied to explain the effect of ownership structure 
on firm value (Certo et al., 2001; Leland & Pyle, 1977) and the association between 
financial decisions and firm value (Chemmanur & Fulghieru, 1997; Connelly et al., 
2011; Welch, 1996). In general, previous studies applying signaling theory to examine 
the association between the above factors and firm value, often employ firm leverage 
as a medium for the (signaling) channel (Gajewski, Ginglinger & Lasfer, 2007). More 
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specifically, debt can be considered a signal: it has shown a positive relationship with 
firm value - increase in stock price in developed economies - due to the monitoring 
abilities of lenders ( James, 1987; Lummer & McConnell, 1989).  
 However, in transition economies where state ownership is prevalent, debt 
is unfavorably perceived by investors because the external monitoring system is 
underdeveloped and the internal corporate governance is generally weak (Baer & 
Gray, 1995; Dharwadkar et al, 2000). In China, state ownership is generally found to 
be associated with high levels of debt (Lu, 2000; Lu et al. 2005) especially in bad debt 
(Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; Gordon & Li, 2003). Specifically, the state is considered as 
a big debtor in a weak internal - external governance context. Moreover, a high level of 
state ownership, associated with high level of firm performance, is likely to signal to the 
market that the Chinese government may take a disproportional profit to make up for 
the financial support they provide to the firms (Sun, Li & Zou, 2005). 
Although we suggest that state ownership is associated with positively reported firm 
performance due to both the financial support and administrative manipulation from 
the government, we argue that the association is perceived by the market more as a 
consequence of the second. In other words, the well known manipulation of accounting 
value (Peng, 2006) as well as the conventional view of the state as a restructuring or 
inhibiting force may send a negative signal to investors. Therefore, the firms’ reported 
positive firm performance under the condition of high levels of state ownership may 
not convince the market, resulting in the reduction of firm value.
From the perspective of investors, state ownership is generally observed as a major 
inhibiting factor for both technical and administrative changes (Zhou, Tse & Li, 2006). 
We argue that the market responds positively to the process of privatization. More 
specifically, privatization is positively appreciated because of better monitoring from 
outsiders and more restructuring motivates insiders, thus, subsequently, enhancing 
firm value (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). In other words, the reduction of levels of state 
ownership is “welcomed” by the market. Again, the positive association between 
state ownership and firm performance is more likely to be perceived negatively than 
positively by the market. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a negative interaction between state ownership and firm perfor-
mance with respect to their impact on firm value in transition economies.
methodology
Sample Characteristics
Our hypotheses are tested with a large sample of companies traded on China’s two stock 
exchanges in the two years 2004 and 2005. It is noted that there were many regulatory 
reforms in China in 2001 encouraging firms to be more market oriented and better 
monitored (Peng, 2004; Tenev & Zhang, 2002). Consequently, we assume that these 
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reforms had started to be effective by 2004 (i.e., less state-control). Therefore, choosing 
the two years of 2004-05 may also be considered as a proper trial to see if Chinese listed 
firms have been free from, or at least, less dependent on state manipulation.   
The data is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR) of the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd, 
(see http://www.gtadata.com). Financial firms and firms with less than six months of 
trading are not included in the sample. In addition, extreme outliers with regard to our 
paper’s variables are trimmed from the data. Specifically, our sample consists of 1,154 
firms from the financial year 2004, and 1,255 firms from 2005.
We acknowledge that on the one hand, using secondary data has its own limitations 
in the Chinese context (Lin, 2004), while on the other, primary data collection in 
emerging markets has been a serious challenge to researchers (Hoskisson et al., 2000), 
particularly in China (Wang, Zhang & Goodfellow, 1998). In using this data we draw 
comfort from the experience of the data supplier as well as the relative popularity of the 
database. 
Measures
Dependent Variable:
Firm value or market-based value (Tobin’s Q): Most studies on ownership and firm value 
have used Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market value to book value of the firm) as a measure of 
firm value (Demsetz & Villalonga 2001). Thus, following previous studies (e.g., Wei et 
al., 2005), Tobin’s Q is also adopted here as a proxy for firm value.
Firm performance or accounting returns (ROA and ROS): ROA (the ratio of earnings 
before interest and tax to total assets) has been widely used to measure firm performance 
(e.g., Sun & Tong, 2003; Xu & Wang, 1999). The literature generally shows that the three 
commonly used financial measures – return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS) have almost the same empirical quality for evaluating performance 
(Markides, 1995). However, of the three measurements of firm performance, ROA has 
been the most commonly used (Carton and Hofer, 2006). In the Chinese context, ROA 
is assumed to be more appropriate than ROE since accounting data on assets is more 
stable than share value (Peng and Luo, 2000). We therefore use ROA as a proxy for firm 
performance. In addition, ROS (the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total sales) 
is employed as a second proxy to test the robustness of our results.  
Independent Variables:
State Ownership (state): The main independent variable is state ownership (state). State 
is the percentage of shares owned by the state at a central and local level, including 
shares of governmental institutions (state legal-person). However, reported state 
ownership measured in this way may under-estimate state control resulting from such 
issues as dual classes of shares, control pyramids and cross-shareholding (Green & Liu, 
2005). In such conditions, however, researchers consider using the above description 
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of state ownership. In our sample, state ownership extends from 0% (i.e., the SOE 
is fully privatized) to 85%, with an average of 35.2 %, and 34% for 2004 and 2005 
respectively.      
Control Variables:
Firm size (logempl): Firm size may represent the potential economies of scale and scope 
which may be associated with firm profitability (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Ang, Cole 
& Lin, 2000). Therefore, we control for firm size, specifically, the logarithm of total 
employees (logempl). 
Debt-to-equity ratio (LEV): Debt is assumed to have a positive association with 
state ownership (Lu et al., 2005) and thus affects firm performance (Sun et al., 2002). 
Therefore, we control for the debt-to-equity ratio (LEV) in studying the relationships 
between state ownership and firm performance/value.
 Industries: Chinese firms may have different level of state intervention because 
industries are considered differently in terms of their political importance (Nee, 
Opper, & Wong, 2007). Acknowledging the variance in the level of state support across 
industries, we control for industries as dummy variables.
results
Table 1 shows that there is no high correlation among independent and control 
variables. In addition, the maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the variables 
is under 2.0, much smaller than the threshold of 10 specified by Neter et al. (1996). 
Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. We carried out further 
tests to ensure the applicability of OLS regression to our data. For example, using the 
P-P plot, our data satisfied the assumption of normality of the dependent variable, and 
scatter graphs suggested a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Tests for heteroskedasticity and correlation error terms showed neither of 
these problems were in the data. 
TABLE 1. descriptive Statistics and correlations
    Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
    Mean 1.33 0.02 0.02 0.47 3.18 0.36
    Std.Deviation 0.69 0.06 0.39 0.19 0.56 0.26
1. Firm value Tobin Q 1.00
2. Firm performance ROA  0.16*** 1.00
3. Firm performance ROS  0.00  0.65*** 1.00
4. Debt-equity ratio (LEV) -0.21*** -0.38*** -0.33*** 1.00
5. Firm size (logempl) -0.15***  0.11*** 0.06** 0.06** 1.00
6. State ownership (state) -0.04  0.12*** 0.11*** -0.10***   0.19*** 1.00
Notes: †p <0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Table 2 shows the results of the hierarchical regression that we use to test the 
association of the control variables (LEV, logempl and industries dummies) and the 
independent variable state with firm performance (ROA) for two consecutive years 
2004 and 2005. 
TABLE 2. results of regression analysis for roa
 
variable
2004 2005
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
Intercept 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03*
Debt-equity ratio (LEV) -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.22***
Firm size (logempl) 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Industries dummies (ind) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ownership (state)  0.01*  0.02*
ΔR2  0.01**  0.01**
F-value for ΔR2  2.99**  3.13*
R2 0.17 0.18 0.33 0.34
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.17 0.32 0.33
N = 1154 1255
Notes: †p <0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Models 1 and 3 show a significant association (p<.001) between two of the 
control variables (LEV and logempl) with firm performance (ROA). Specifically, the 
results indicate that firm size of Chinese privatized SOEs is positively related to firm 
performance. However, leverage (LEV) is found to be negatively associated with firm 
performance (ROA). This is consistent with Dharwadkar et al.’s (2000) proposition 
that debt in transition economies is negatively associated with firm performance. 
The results are consistent through the two years 2004 and 2005. With regards to the 
possible association with industry, two out of twelve industry dummies, have significant 
(positive) associations with firm value (for the sake of brevity, report on industries 
dummies is not included).
State ownership (state) is added to Model 2 (2004), and Model 4 (2005). In support 
of H1 in relation to state ownership and firm performance, both models show that 
state is positively related to ROA, statistically significant (p<0.05) for the two years. 
Therefore, with ROA used as a proxy for firm performance, H1 is supported: state is 
positively associated with ROA. 
In addition, similar results are found when ROS is used as a measure of firm 
performance as shown in Table 3.
Results for testing Hypotheses 2 are reported in Table 4. Firm size, leverage and 
industry dummies are used to control for the association between ROA/ROS and 
Tobin’s Q as well as the moderating effect of state on the association between ROA/ROS 
and Tobin’s Q. Different from its association with firm performance, firm size is found 
to be negatively associated with firm value (p<.001). The association between LEV and 
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TABLE 3. results of regression analysis for roS
 variable
2004 2005
model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8
Intercept 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01
Debt-equity ratio (LEV) -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.50*** -0.50***
Firm size (logempl)  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Industries dummies (ind) Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ownership (state)  0.08*  0.04*
ΔR2  0.005**  0.01*
F-value for ΔR2  3.47**  2.74*
R2 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.27
N = 1154 1255
Notes: †p <0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
TABLE 4. results of regression analysis on firm value (tobin Q)
variable
2004 2005
model 9 model 10 model 11 model 12 model 13 model 14
Intercept 2.4*** 2.38*** 2.39*** 1.38*** 1.40*** 1.37***
Debt-equity ratio (LEV) -0.46*** -0.28** -0.50*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.21**
Firm size (logempl) -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.19***
Industries dummies (ind) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ownership (state)  -0.06 -0.06  -0.04 0.00
Firm performance (ROA)  -0.30*   -0.98***  
Firm performance* state 
ownership (ROA*state)   5.10***   4.43***  
Firm performance (ROS)   -0.22***   -0.19**
Firm performance* state 
ownership (ROS*state)   0.76***   1.07***
ΔR2    0.02*** 0.01***  0.03*** 0.01***
F-value for ΔR2  10.20*** 6.40***  12.93*** 6.08***
R2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.13
N = 1154 1255
Notes: †p <0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Tobin’s Q is inconclusive: it is negatively related to Tobin’s Q in 2004 but positively related 
to Tobin’s Q in 2005. Model 10 and Model 13 show a negative association between ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. The relationship is significant at p<.05 for 2004 and at p<.001 for 2005. R 
squared change increases 2% for 2004 (p<.001) and 3% for 2005 (p<.001). Therefore, 
our proposition for a negative between firm performance and firm value is supported 
with ROA as a proxy for firm performance. Similar results are also found for ROS in 
support of the proposition in Models 11 and 14. 
84 
However, with regard to the moderating effect of state ownership on the association 
between firm performance and firm value, the interaction terms between state and ROA 
(Model 10 and 13) and between state and ROS (Model 11 and 14) are all found to be 
positively associated with the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) (p<.001). Therefore, state 
ownership does not strengthen the negative association between ROA/ROS and Tobin’s 
Q but instead turns the association to be positive. Specifically, at a low level of state 
ownership, firm performance is negatively related to firm value. However, at a high level 
of state ownership, firm performance is positively related to firm value (Figures 1–4). 
Therefore, H2 is not supported in terms of a reinforcing effect of state ownership.
FIGURE 1. moderating effect of state on the association between roa and Q (2004)
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FIGURE 2.  moderating effect of state on the association between roS and Q (2004)
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FIGURE 3. moderating effect of state on the association between roa and Q (2005)
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Discussion and Conclusions
This paper may be the first to examine the role of state ownership in the association be-
tween firm performance (accounting returns) and firm value (Tobin’s Q), at least in the 
case of China. In addition, the paper provides some explanation for the difference between 
the impact of state ownership on firm performance and that on firm value, an aspect that 
has previously been overlooked. While the results do not support the hypothesized view 
that state ownership strengthens the negative association between firm performance and 
firm value, the paper demonstrates a moderating effect of state ownership on the associa-
tion. Specifically, at high levels of state ownership, and not as hypothesized, firm perfor-
mance is favorably perceived by the market (firm performance and firm value are posi-
tively related). However, at low levels of state ownership, and as hypothesized, firms are 
highly-valued by the market even when firm performance is reported to be low. 
Not as hypothesized, however interesting, state ownership and its positive impact 
on firm performance have not been negatively perceived but rather confirmed by 
investors in the Chinese market. Investors are more likely to appreciate the high level of 
state ownership and they may be convinced by the positive association between state 
ownership and firm performance. In other words, the investors may not think that the 
positive association is a consequence of accounting manipulation and thus temporal. 
Investors are, therefore, willing to invest in the firms with high state ownership and 
reported firm performance. As a consequence, stock price increases. The results still 
show that signaling theory can help explain the investors’ perception towards low levels 
of state ownership in that the market responds positively to privatization, i.e., firms with 
low levels of state ownership are highly valued by the market even in the case of low 
level of accounting performance. This may imply market support towards the process 
of privatization. Being free from governmental support also means being free from state 
intervention as well as possible governmental disproportional withdrawal of profit. 
This eventually helps the firm to survive better in the long run. However, the negative 
association between accounting performance and firm value in firms with low levels of 
state ownership needs further examination. 
FIGURE 4. moderating effect of state ownership on the association between roS and Q (2005)
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Our results show that the Chinese government still strategically assists privatized 
SOEs with high levels of state ownership. In this context, investors may be sufficiently 
alert and practical to invest in the high state ownership -high reported firm performance 
firms which eventually raise firm value of the firms. In addition, it is likely that there is 
administrative support for reporting high firm performance in the firms. We maintain a 
skeptical view on this type of non-market oriented subsidization even though, as found, it 
may be associated with both firm performance and firm value. Specifically, we assume that 
the administrative intervention, boosting firm performance, may temporarily cloak poor 
management of firms but fail to prevent firm value from declining in the long run.  
As with any applied research, this study has its limitations. First, we note that the 
paper fails to prove that state ownership strengthens the negative association between 
firm performance and firm value as hypothesized. Rather, results show that the 
association turns to be positive when state ownership is high. In other words, investors 
may perceive highly reported accounting returns (firm performance) as a signal for 
investing regardless of the likelihood of administrative distortion due to the high levels 
of state ownership. Further research is needed to establish the mechanisms that explain 
this outcome. If China’s unique investing environment, resulting from cultural and eco-
political characteristics, is responsible, this needs to be modeled and better understood. 
Second, with complex cross-shareholdings between different national and provincial 
state agencies and state-controlled firms in China, this paper may not precisely identify 
state influences. Therefore, state control devices such as pyramids, cross-shareholding 
and multiple share classes have not been explored and this is potentially another complex 
issue that deserves focused research. Third, this research is limited to a short window 
of observation, 2004-2005. While this period is very important, following governance 
reforms in China, it may not fully capture the dynamic perceptions of the market toward 
changes in state support as well as possible state accounting manipulation. Hence, future 
longitudinal studies that include recent years, concerning these issues may help confirm 
the perspectives as well as findings from this research.  
Finally, similar studies can be carried out for other transitional nations such as 
India, Vietnam, and many developing African countries, where governments still 
retain their dominant ownership as well as administrative influence in post-privatized 
firms, a situation common in China (Birdsall & Nellis, 2005). For example, Vietnam, a 
transitional country, that has reformed the economy, without significantly transforming 
her political system (Vu, 2005; Wright & Nguyen, 2000), could provide a somewhat 
similar laboratory context for researchers, to replicate our study. In addition, the huge 
divergence of firm value of Vietnamese listed firms from their accounting returns due 
to both the Vietnamese government’s support for their privatized SOEs and the surge 
of foreign investment into the market (Suri & Dinh, 2007) may be linked to what has 
happened in China. The findings of this study may therefore provide useful implications 
for foreign investors who have been involved as well as those who intend to invest in 
Vietnam’s fledgling stock market. However, the generalization of our results will be 
more compelling if the institutional elements, including the political context of the 
researched countries are taken into consideration. 
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